

Toward a Theory of the Guiding Intelligence Apparatus: Principles, Organizational Foundations, and Empirical Evidence

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ABSTRACT

The theory of the “Guiding Intelligence Apparatus” reflects several decades of direct operational responsibility within the intelligence institutions of the Islamic Republic, particularly during the first decade after the Revolution—a period in which, despite the absence of professional structures, this nascent apparatus successfully neutralized complex and well-supported subversive movements through an approach grounded in human dignity, innate disposition (fitrah), and guidance. An analysis of this experience demonstrates that its effectiveness did not stem from conventional coercive intelligence models, but rather from prioritizing the reform of beliefs and orientations, the completion of moral and rational justification (itmām-i-hujjah), and the reconstruction of the adversary’s inner disposition before resorting to hard measures. As a result, this model—empirically tested in numerous cases against ideological, separatist, and insurgent groups—offers a uniquely indigenous, ethics-based framework for transforming opponents into constructive social capacities and establishing durable security.

Moreover, comparative study shows that this guiding approach reduces the social and political costs of confrontation, mitigates hostility, and enables the engagement of opponents at the deepest layers of personality—beliefs, orientations, and existential attitudes—rather than merely modifying external behaviors. The stability of its outcomes across multiple security domains underlines its adaptability to emerging threats and confirms its conceptual robustness. Therefore, articulating and disseminating this theory not only fills a major gap in Islamic security thought but also provides a scientifically grounded basis for training future intelligence professionals and for presenting a credible Islamic-Iranian paradigm to societies seeking humane and principled security models.

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Introduction

The victory of the Islamic Revolution occurred at a moment when the security apparatus of the previous regime had collapsed, leaving the newly established government confronted with the most extensive constellation of opposition forces in modern Iranian history. Armed separatist groups, Marxist and leftist guerrilla organizations supported by Eastern and Western blocs, remnants of the Pahlavi-era intelligence networks, coup plotters, dual-position actors within the Provisional Government, and various organized counterrevolutionary factions all emerged simultaneously. Considering their scale, diversity, and the external intelligence and media backing they enjoyed, classical security logic would predict that such threats should have toppled a nascent state within months.

Yet, in an unprecedented experience, the Islamic Republic not only survived but rapidly neutralized major counterrevolutionary networks and diffused numerous complex crises—despite lacking conventional security structures. The intelligence forces of the first revolutionary decade—young, inexperienced, and untrained in Western security doctrines—relied instead on faith, innate moral intuition, human dignity, and practices derived from religious understanding. Through this, they operationalized an approach in which guidance preceded elimination, persuasion preceded coercion, moral admonition preceded punitive measures, attraction superseded exclusion, and reform took precedence over suppression.

This indigenous model, organically born from the lived experience of the Revolution

and here termed the “Guidance-Oriented Intelligence Model,” successfully managed highly complex security threats with minimal cost and maximum sustainability. The experience of that decade demonstrated that guidance-orientation is not a security weakness; rather, it constitutes a source of strategic effectiveness, since many security threats are human, cognitive, and thus reformable. Scriptural foundations reinforce this approach: the inherent dignity of humankind (Qur’an, 17:70), the imperative of calling toward truth with wisdom and sound reasoning (Qur’an, 16:125), and the principle that coercive force is the “last remedy” rather than the first resort (Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 168).

Over time, however, as formal structures consolidated, the country’s intelligence apparatus gradually drifted away from this original model. The influx of translated Western texts and the ascendancy of coercive, control-oriented paradigms marginalized guidance-based, ethical, and innate approaches. Consequently, certain dimensions of effectiveness declined, operational costs increased, and the system became entangled with relatively minor threats—a clear symptom of theoretical and operational dislocation from the Revolution’s founding model.

Meanwhile, examinations of Western security literature reveal that Western paradigms themselves have increasingly faced crises born of “hard security” logic. Some Researches explicitly demonstrate that Western security approaches are structured around the weaponization of information and the intensification of hostility rather than human reform (Ventre, 2016). Likewise, emerging research on cognitive warfare and propaganda (Jatmiko, 2023) shows that

Western security institutions, relying on deception and mental manipulation, frequently reproduce rather than resolve crises. Even those Western studies that speak of “interaction” or “learning”—such as Lundvall (1992) and Edquist (2005)—ultimately pursue the optimization of capitalist systems rather than the guidance or moral elevation of the human being, and thus remain fundamentally incompatible with a theocentric, guidance-oriented worldview.

Accordingly, the central problem of this research is not the design of a new model, for the model in question has already been realized in practice during the first decade of the Revolution and has proven its effectiveness. The actual problem is as follows: How can the guidance-oriented intelligence model of the Revolution’s first decade—already realized, indigenous, and empirically effective—be systematically extracted, conceptually articulated, and theoretically reconstructed so that it may serve as the strategic foundation of the Islamic government’s intelligence apparatus under contemporary complex conditions?

The significance of this problem arises, first, from the urgent need to restore practical effectiveness within the intelligence apparatus through a scholarly return to the Revolution’s authentic model, and second, from the broader intellectual necessity within Islamic security studies for a coherent, indigenous theory grounded in scriptural principles and revolutionary experience. For these reasons, the theoretical reconstruction of the “Guidance-Oriented Intelligence System” is not a discretionary choice but a strategic and civilizational imperative for the future of the Islamic Republic.

Literature Review

What Is The Theory?

In the social sciences, a *theory* is understood as a systematic and structured set of concepts and propositions that explains and predicts a social phenomenon (Bacharach, 1989). A theory provides an analytical framework through which researchers identify causal mechanisms, organize observations, and generate coherent interpretations of empirical reality (Chijioke, 2021). It also guides the research process by shaping questions, structuring methods, and giving coherence to data analysis; without a theory, scientific inquiry lacks conceptual clarity, analytical direction, and the capacity for generalization (Schutt, 2019). Methodological literature emphasizes that a theory is not merely a collection of definitions or isolated findings, but a coherent explanatory system that clarifies the “how” and “why” behind observed patterns and reveals the underlying order within social reality (LibreTexts, 2022, July 28). Theory further functions as a benchmark for evaluating the validity of scientific explanations, since a claim becomes scientifically meaningful only when embedded within a logically consistent, testable theoretical structure (Social Science Research, 2021). Thus, theory serves not only as an analytical tool, but also as the fundamental foundation upon which research questions, hypotheses, and analytical pathways are constructed.

What Is The Intelligence Apparatus?

In international scholarship, an intelligence apparatus is generally understood as a specialized institution within the structure of the state, responsible for providing strategic analysis, identifying threats, assessing opportunities, and generating security-

relevant insight required for national decision-making. Within this perspective, such an apparatus functions as part of the state's machinery for ensuring national security and preventing strategic surprise, often covering domains such as domestic security, foreign threats, military developments, emerging risks, and transnational networks (DCAF, 2015). In many systems it is described as the “eyes and ears” of the state, tasked with monitoring environmental trends and presenting an accurate picture of present and future conditions to policymakers (Saferworld, 2022). From this angle, the intelligence apparatus is fundamentally an instrument of situational understanding—an institutional mechanism enabling the state to base its decisions on a correct reading of reality. More strategic definitions describe it as covert state activity aimed at understanding, influencing, or defending against threats in order to achieve positional advantage, a definition reflected in several dominant models of security analysis (Macpherson & Hastedt, 2023).

Although this constitutes the prevailing global framework, differing national experiences and epistemological foundations have produced diverse interpretations of what an intelligence apparatus is. The dominant Western paradigm tends to conceptualize the intelligence apparatus as an institution for managing threats, controlling behavior, achieving cognitive superiority, and, where deemed necessary, eliminating sources of risk. Under this approach, the primary function of the apparatus is to disrupt the adversary's decision-cycle and secure dominance within the cognitive or operational environment, as extensively discussed in theories of cognitive warfare and perceptual conflict (Libicki, 1995; U.S. DoD,

2014; Claverie & Du Cluzel, 2020). Within this logic, the human being is viewed primarily as a threat actor, and the mission of the apparatus is defined in terms of control, neutralization, or removal of that actor.

The post-revolutionary Iranian experience—particularly during the first decade—articulates a fundamentally different conception. In this experience, the intelligence apparatus is not an institution designed to dominate the human being or regulate his behavior; rather, it is a mechanism for guiding, reforming, and re-orienting the human being toward the path of innate moral truth. This apparatus sees the individual not as a “security target” in the conventional sense, but as an invitee—a person possessing inherent dignity who can, through affection, explanation, dialogue, admonition, and gradual transformation of orientation, be brought back to the correct path (Invitee vs Target). Its aim is not merely the production of security, but the cultivation of stability grounded in justice, human growth, and social rectification. Accordingly, its core operational mechanism is the removal of threat through guidance, rather than the elimination of the threatening actor. This approach was vividly demonstrated throughout numerous real cases during the first decade of the Islamic Revolution, in which many adversaries and problematic individuals, after undergoing a guidance-centered engagement, not only ceased to pose danger but became valuable contributors to national stability. This indigenous model rests on the premise that human-origin threats often arise from cognitive distortion, analytical error, or manipulation, and can therefore be transformed through corrective orientation and reconstruction of understanding. From this standpoint, the intelligence apparatus within the Islamic

revolutionary framework is more than a security institution; it is a civilizational institution whose mission is to secure society through the elevation and refinement of the human being rather than through his suppression or containment. Although this conception diverges sharply from dominant global models, it was not merely theorized but empirically validated during the early revolutionary decade.

Dominant Theories In Intelligence Apparatus

In global security studies, dominant theories concerning the intelligence apparatus are largely built upon power-centered and threat-centered logics. The realist tradition—still the governing framework behind many Western intelligence institutions—portrays the state as operating in an anarchic environment where survival depends on gaining advantage over others. Within this logic, the intelligence apparatus is defined as the state's primary tool for countering threats, preventing strategic surprise, and maintaining superiority, with its mission centered on controlling, deterring, or, when necessary, removing the threat (Waltz, 1979). This view has profoundly shaped modern security thinking and continues to serve as the intellectual foundation of most conventional intelligence structures.

Alongside realism, a second cluster of theories highlights the role of manipulating perception and engineering the adversary's decision-making. These theories argue that superiority emerges not merely from material capability but from disrupting cognitive processes, altering interpretations, and inducing analytical error in the adversary. The extensive literature on cognitive warfare—particularly within institutions such as NATO and the U.S. Department of

Defense—frames the human mind as the primary battlespace and requires the intelligence apparatus to shape narratives, influence interpretive frameworks, and dominate the adversary's cognitive environment (Claverie & Du Cluzel, 2020; U.S. DoD, 2014). In this paradigm, the human being is reduced to an operational domain subject to influence and manipulation.

A third major perspective is the theory of covert statecraft, which conceptualizes the intelligence apparatus as an instrument for advancing national interests outside formal diplomatic channels. This approach emphasizes clandestine operations, infiltration, covert networks, strategic disruption, and targeted interventions designed to alter the balance of power in the state's favor (Lowenthal, 2017). Within this framework, the intelligence apparatus acts not merely as an analyst but as an active shaper of the competitive environment, tasked with recalibrating external realities through covert action.

In contrast to these three frameworks—each of which ultimately centers on control, management, or elimination of threats—the post-revolutionary Iranian experience, particularly during the first decade, articulated a fundamentally different model. In this experience, the intelligence apparatus operated not as a tool for domination but as a mechanism for guiding and reforming the human being. The practical record of that period—shaped by several decades of field responsibility carried by revolutionary cadres—demonstrated that many human-driven threats could be resolved not through pressure or suppression but through cognitive restoration, moral engagement, affection, admonition, and granting individuals a

genuine path back to truth. Archival accounts and field testimonies from that decade show that numerous members of hostile groups, after undergoing a guidance-centered process, not only ceased to pose danger but became loyal contributors to national stability. This empirically validated approach, preceding any formal theorization, revealed that the human being is not inherently a “threat actor” and that an intelligence apparatus can function as a structure of reform, transformation, and moral elevation—something unaccounted for in the dominant global theories. This foundational divergence between prevailing paradigms and the revolutionary experience provides the basis for the research gap that the next section will address.

Research Gap

The international literature in intelligence studies—both in its classical foundations and contemporary developments—largely rests on paradigms that conceptualize the human being as an object of operation and the intelligence apparatus as an instrument for control, manipulation, or elimination of perceived threats. In these paradigms, intelligence work is defined through logics of power, superiority, behavioral control, and cognitive dominance. Classical works such as Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (1977) portray modern intelligence and surveillance structures as mechanisms of discipline, while Schmitt’s *The Concept of the Political* (2007) frames politics itself around the friend–enemy distinction, making the intelligence apparatus a tool for managing the “enemy.” Newer approaches—reflected in works on cognitive warfare (Claverie & Du Cluzel, 2020), perception management, and narrative warfare—further emphasize intervention in human cognition, disruption of analytical

processes, and shaping of adversarial decision-making cycles. In all these frameworks, the human being appears primarily as a target rather than a transformable moral subject.

However, historical evidence from the early years of the Islamic Revolution presents an alternative model altogether—one almost entirely absent from international scholarship. In that formative decade, the intelligence apparatus operated not on the basis of coercion, but on a guidance-centered logic grounded in human dignity, moral persuasion, cognitive correction, and the revival of innate orientation. Threats were frequently resolved not through suppression but through deep reasoning, moral engagement, affection, admonition, and the provision of a genuine path for return. Numerous archival accounts demonstrate that individuals deeply embedded in hostile groups underwent transformative cognitive and moral change and subsequently shifted from being active threats to constructive contributors. This historical corpus indicates that the Iranian revolutionary model of intelligence functioned on an anthropological rather than coercive foundation—a phenomenon that current Western-derived theories are fundamentally unable to conceptualize.

Even the most recent streams in intelligence discourse—such as theories of cognitive intelligence, perception management, and behavioral control—continue to rely on assumptions that treat the human mind as a battlespace and human cognition as an object of engineering, rather than a field of moral transformation. This orientation is evident in influential works such as Nye’s *Soft Power* (2004), Libicki’s *Information Warfare* (1995), and NATO’s and the U.S. Department

of Defense's doctrinal texts on cognitive and perceptual operations (NATO Innovation Hub, 2020; U.S. DoD, 2014). Because these frameworks presuppose manipulation, dominance, and behavioral shaping, they are theoretically incapable of explaining an intelligence model designed to remove threats through guidance, persuasion, and reconstruction of orientation.

Thus, the central research gap in intelligence studies is the absence of a coherent, scientifically grounded theory capable of explaining the guidance-based, human-centered, and transformation-oriented intelligence model demonstrated in the early Islamic Revolution. Existing theories neither capture its anthropological foundations nor account for its demonstrable effectiveness in converting adversaries, resolving threats ethically, and stabilizing the socio-political environment without relying on coercive force. This gap signals a critical need for a new theoretical framework rooted in lived historical practice, informed by Islamic-revolutionary anthropology, and capable of offering a credible alternative to the dominance-oriented paradigms that currently shape global intelligence discourse.

Methodology

This study adopts the Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach, a methodological framework grounded in the integration of action, lived experience, and continuous reflection. In this approach, the researcher does not stand as an external observer but as an active participant whose engagement in the field becomes a primary source of knowledge. PAR, as described in the classical literature, is a cyclical method involving participation, observation, reflection, and iterative refinement, allowing the researcher

to uncover processes that can only be understood within the dynamics of real practice, human interaction, and decision-making (Reason & Bradbury, 2008). This approach is particularly suited to domains in which the phenomenon under study is not fully accessible from the outside and requires internal presence within processes, interactions, and field logic—a characteristic strongly applicable to intelligence studies (Kemmis, McTaggart & Nixon, 2014).

In the context of this research, the choice of PAR is justified by the nature of the subject itself. The internal logic and operational mechanisms of a guidance-oriented intelligence apparatus cannot be adequately captured through documents, secondary data, or retrospective interviews alone. Much of this logic is embedded within practical experience, human encounters, cycles of analysis and decision-making, and the ways in which behavioral change unfolds in real interactions. PAR enables the researcher to analyze these dynamics not from a distance, but from within the field, drawing on lived participation to reveal the often-invisible processes that shape the functioning of such an apparatus.

The researcher's background makes this approach both valid and necessary. With several decades of direct involvement in the intelligence field—particularly during the formative first decade after the Islamic Revolution—the researcher has participated in authentic cycles of analysis, guidance of adversarial actors, threat resolution, cognitive and moral engagement with individuals, and real-time decision-making. These extensive experiences satisfy the central requirement noted in the methodological literature: that for PAR to be credible, the researcher must be a

practitioner–observer embedded in the real context of action (McIntyre, 2007). Since the guidance-oriented intelligence model is fundamentally rooted in human encounters, moral persuasion, correction of orientations, and deep cognitive transformation, only a method that emerges from direct practice can accurately capture its inner workings.

Thus, Participatory Action Research is not merely an appropriate methodological choice; it is the only approach capable of elucidating the inner logic of a guidance-based intelligence system through field-derived, experience-grounded analysis. Other methods—such as documentary research or secondary analysis—are inherently incapable of revealing the depth, subtlety, and human-centered processes that define this model. In this sense, PAR is less an optional technique than a methodological necessity dictated by the essence of the phenomenon under study, which can only be meaningfully understood through direct engagement and reflective practice (Stringer, 2014).

Findings

Based on the systematic refinement of the theory and the analysis of historical, cognitive, ethical, and field-based evidence, a set of foundational propositions emerges that constitutes the conceptual architecture of the Guidance-Oriented Intelligence Organization. These propositions articulate the fundamental divergence of this model from dominant intelligence paradigms, demonstrating that the proposed framework operates not through fear, coercive dominance, or psychological manipulation, but through a synthesis of innate human orientation, moral guidance, dignity, rationality, and principled force. In the subsequent sections, each proposition will be examined through five evidentiary lenses—sociological, jurisprudential–theological, historical (Islamic), philosophical–logical, and psychological. The present section outlines only the distilled theoretical form of these propositions.




Figure 1. Steps for refining the Guiding Intelligence Organization Theory (IOT)

The first proposition establishes a structural contrast with the global paradigm of the fear-inducing intelligence organization—a model deeply rooted in international intelligence literature that defines intelligence services as institutions of intimidation, control, coercion, and elimination of human threats. In contrast, the guidance-oriented model posits that an intelligence organization, in its authentic and elevated form, is a guidance-centered, human-understanding, ethically grounded institution whose principal mission is to remove threats through guidance rather than through manufactured fear or domination.

The second proposition rests on the innate disposition of the human being (*fiṭrah*) and the possibility of cognitive, ethical, and doctrinal transformation. According to this view, the human—even in the state of antagonism—is capable of return, reorientation, and constructive participation in social security, provided that pathways of guidance, moral engagement, persuasion, and intellectual clarity are genuinely opened to him. This establishes the conceptual distinction between a “rectifiable human threat” and an “irreconcilable ideological hostility.”

The third proposition emphasizes the centrality of human dignity within the intelligence function. Here, intelligence practice—even in adversarial encounters—must be structured around the inviolable worth of the human being, respect for agency, adherence to moral constraints, and

avoidance of degradation or violence lacking ethical and principled justification. This forms the anthropological infrastructure of all processes of guidance, assessment, engagement, and judgment.

The fourth proposition delineates a clear boundary between this theory and the discourse of a naïve, sentimentalist “Rahmani Islam⁴.” While the guidance-oriented model stresses compassion, persuasion, and rectification, it simultaneously affirms that once intellectual clarity, removal of doubt, and full moral proof (*itmam al-hujjah*) have been established, coercive or even annihilative action against an active, destructive threat becomes legitimate and necessary. Thus, guidance orientation does not imply leniency toward organized hostility; rather, it is premised on a principled balance between mercy and firmness.

The fifth proposition asserts that the normative architecture of enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong—in its deep, rational, and tiered form—applies comprehensively to the structure, functions, and internal logic of the intelligence organization. This reconceptualizes intelligence work as a mission of “societal guidance” and “rectification of deviant currents” through persuasion, moral reasoning, intellectual clarification, and removal of the social and cognitive conditions of deviation.

⁴ The notion of “Rahmani Islam” as promoted in certain periods reflected a fundamentally flawed and selective reading of the religion. It emerged from a Western-inclined, reductive understanding of Islam, emphasizing softness and moral relativism while disregarding the faith’s integral components of justice, duty, moral boundaries, and principled resistance. Such an approach—shaped by intellectual dependence

on liberal humanism—stood in clear tension with the Qur’anic framework, Prophetic teachings, and the historical reality of Islam’s civilizational identity. Ultimately, this interpretation functioned less as an authentic religious perspective and more as a conceptual deviation rooted in Westernized misreadings of the tradition.

Finally, the sixth proposition highlights the central role of a morally elevated, patient, disciplined, and intellectually capable intelligence officer. In this model, intelligence work cannot be executed by technocratic operators alone; it requires individuals with ethical maturity, cognitive depth, emotional restraint, social understanding, and the psychological resilience necessary for the transformative human engagements that define the guidance-oriented approach. Here, the intelligence officer is not merely an institutional functionary but a transformative human agent.

Discussion

The empirical findings of this research reveal a striking paradox at the heart of contemporary intelligence practice: despite possessing extensive technical capabilities, advanced surveillance tools, and unprecedented data access, the modern intelligence apparatus has become increasingly entangled in prolonged cycles of instability, social tension, and crisis reproduction. This paradox becomes clearer through comparative analysis with earlier historical experiences. The field-based evidence shows that the actors involved in recent episodes of unrest did not possess ideological coherence, a structured political theory, or long-term strategic planning. Nevertheless, their fragmented activities managed to generate societal disruption for extended periods.

This outcome suggests that the primary challenge lies not in the sophistication of the adversary but in the system's decreasing ability to convert informational awareness into sustainable crisis management. In earlier periods—particularly during the first decade

after the Revolution—the intelligence apparatus demonstrated the capacity to neutralize ideologically rooted, externally supported, and organizationally disciplined adversarial movements before they escalated into widespread crises. The contrast with contemporary conditions raises a critical analytical question: Why has an apparatus that once managed complex, deeply entrenched opposition with limited resources become strained by far less organized and cognitively shallow threats?

The answer cannot be reduced to global transformations, technological shifts, or changes in media ecosystems. Many of the tools available to adversarial actors today are equally accessible to the intelligence apparatus itself. Instead, the core difference lies in the transformation of the underlying logic of intelligence engagement. Over time, the apparatus transitioned from a model grounded in guidance, persuasion, clarification, and reintegration toward an approach increasingly defined by technical control, reactive management, and mechanized intervention.

Historical field evidence indicates that the successes of the early model were not primarily the result of technical superiority, but of deep social understanding, human interaction, moral engagement, and efforts to address the cognitive and ethical roots of deviant trajectories. The more recent overemphasis on tools, data, and control—without a guiding theoretical framework—has resulted in high informational awareness but low strategic outcomes. As a result, despite possessing extensive capabilities, the apparatus often struggles to terminate crises or prevent their recurrence, indicating a systemic imbalance between technical capacity and conceptual orientation.

This analysis supports the broader theoretical argument advanced in this study: intelligence effectiveness is not a simple function of resources or technological sophistication. Instead, it reflects the governing epistemology of the apparatus—its model of human nature, its operational logic, and its conceptual framework for managing threats. When that framework becomes misaligned with the anthropological and normative foundations of the system, the apparatus may accumulate resources while simultaneously diminishing its ability to produce sustainable security.

The findings therefore reinforce the need for a systematic reconstruction of the guidance-oriented intelligence model as a conceptual, methodological, and organizational paradigm. Such reconstruction is not merely a return to historical practice but a strategic necessity for restoring coherence, reducing operational costs, and ensuring that intelligence work remains grounded in principled, human-centered, and effective modes of engagement.

Conclusion

This research demonstrates that the early post-revolutionary model of a guidance-oriented intelligence apparatus constitutes a coherent, empirically validated, and theoretically distinct paradigm with enduring relevance for contemporary conditions. The comparative evidence shows that this model—built on human dignity, cognitive clarification, moral engagement, and the possibility of transformation—was able to convert minimal material resources into significant and lasting security outcomes. Its success originated not from coercive dominance or technical control but from a foundational logic that viewed the human

being as a rectifiable moral subject rather than a fixed security threat.

In contrast, the gradual shift toward a control-based, technically driven, and reactive operational logic has produced an environment in which vast informational capabilities no longer guarantee sustainable results. The apparatus's increasing difficulty in managing relatively minor, fragmented, and cognitively shallow adversarial activity indicates a structural gap between its technical strengths and its conceptual foundations. This gap manifests as reduced effectiveness, heightened operational costs, and a recurring pattern of unresolved or self-reproducing crises.

The central conclusion of this study is that the intelligence apparatus has transitioned from a period in which minimal resources produced maximal strategic outcomes to a period in which maximal resources no longer ensure durable stability. This transformation is not primarily a reflection of deficiencies in skill or technology but of a conceptual and epistemological drift away from the guidance-centered logic that once defined its identity.

Accordingly, the strategic remedy for this drift does not lie in expanding budgets, acquiring additional tools, or multiplying organizational structures. Instead, it requires the deliberate reconstruction of the theoretical, ethical, and operational logic of guidance-based intelligence practice. Only by re-establishing this indigenous and empirically tested framework—rooted in cognitive correction, moral reasoning, human dignity, and structured guidance—can the apparatus restore its capacity to transform threats, stabilize the social environment, and achieve sustainable security outcomes.

The reconstruction of this model is therefore both a scholarly necessity and a strategic imperative. It provides an opportunity to articulate a distinct Islamic-Iranian paradigm of intelligence grounded not in coercive power but in human transformation and moral rectification. By systematizing its principles, clarifying its conceptual architecture, and integrating it into training and institutional design, this model can serve as the foundation for a modern intelligence apparatus capable of responding effectively to contemporary complexities while remaining faithful to its normative and civilizational origins.

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